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1. Introduction 
istorical economic growth can be studied using the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). However, to understand the time dependence of income per capita, 
expressed as GDP/cap, it is necessary to understand not only the economic 
growth, expressed in terms of the GDP, but also the growth of human population.  
The latest theory describing economic growth is the Unified Growth Theory 
(Galor, 2005, 2011). The theory, or model, describing the growth of human 
population is the Demographic Transition Theory (see for instance Caldwell, 1976, 
2006; Casterline, 2003; Coale, 1973; Haupt & Kane, 2005; Kirk, 1996; Landry, 
1934; Lee, 2003; Lehr, 2009; McFalls, 2007; Notestein, 1945; Olshansky & Ault, 
1986; Olshansky, Carnes, Rogers, & Smith, 1997, 1998; Omran, 1971, 1983, 1998, 
2005; Rogers & Hackenberg, 1987; Singha & Zacharia, 1984; Thompson, 1929; 
van de Kaa, 2008; Warf, 2010). Both of these theories use similar language and 
interpretations. Both of them divide growth into distinctly different stages governed 
by distinctly different mechanisms. In particular, both of them claim the existence 
of the ages-long epoch of Malthusian stagnation followed by a sudden transition to 
a distinctly different stage, the transition described as a sudden takeoff, spurt, sprint 
or explosion.  
A study published over 50 years ago (von Foerster, Mora & Amiot, 1960) 
demonstrated that the growth of the world population was hyperbolic during the 
AD era, showing implicitly that the epoch of stagnation did not exist and that there 
was no sudden transition to a new type of growth. This study has shown that the 
growth of human population during the AD era was following a monotonically 
increasing trajectory. As explained elsewhere (Nielsen, 2014), such a growth cannot 
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be divided into distinctly different sections governed by distinctly different 
mechanisms of growth. A single mechanism has to be applied to the whole 
distribution. For reasons, which are hard to understand, this crucial publication (von 
Foerster, Mora & Amiot, 1960) appears to have been ignored in the demographic 
research.  
More recently (Nielsen, 2016), it has been demonstrated that the growth of the 
world population was hyperbolic not only during the AD era, as pointed out by von 
Foerster, Mora and Amiot (1960) but also during the BC era. Furthermore, it has 
been shown that there was no stagnation and no transition to a faster growth as 
claimed by the Demographic Growth Theory. This study identified only two 
transitions in the past but they were transitions of entirely different kind than 
claimed by the Demographic Transition Theory. They were transitions from 
hyperbolic growth to hyperbolic growth. The first transition was from a fast 
hyperbolic growth to a significantly slower hyperbolic growth and the second 
transition from a slow hyperbolic growth to a slightly faster hyperbolic growth. 
Thus, these two studies (Nielsen, 2016; von Foerster, Mora & Amiot, 1960) 
demonstrate that the Demographic Transition Theory is incorrect. Now we shall 
discuss additional evidence and we shall show that the Demographic Transition 
Theory is contradicted not only by the aggregate data describing the growth of the 
population but also by data describing birth and death rates.  
Demographic Transition Theory has been described a ghost story (Abernethy, 
1995). This theory should have been discarded long time ago but it is still in 
circulation and many a demographer would passionately defend its concepts. 
Abernethy wonders why this dead theory is still being resurrected and her plausible 
explanation is that it is because of the respect to elders. However, would elders feel 
happy to be so protected?  
Science is full of discarded theories and explanations.This is how science works. 
New ideas are tried and if they do not work they are replaced by better ideas or 
simply abandoned. To cling to incorrect ideas just because we cannot think about 
something better to replace them is scientifically unjustified.  
Friedman, Managing Editor of the Population and Development Review, claims 
that the Demographic Transition Theory with its “formulaic presentation of the four 
states” “is largely a straw man” (Friedman, 2015). This classical version of the 
Demographic Transition Theory is now known as the first demographic transition 
to which a second demographic transition has been added (Lesthaeghe, 2010, 2014; 
Lesthaeghe & van de Kaa, 1986; van de Kaa, 2001, 2002). The classical four stages 
of growth are still there even though they have no convincing support in data. “It is 
fair to say, that nearly all statements of a general kind about the classical - for me 
now the first - demographic transition, can be easily contradicted” (van de Kaa, 
2002, p. 9). The classical Demographic Transition Theory appears to have been not 
only acknowledged but also reinforced by adding the international migration 
component. Kirk observed that “Demography is a science short on theory, but rich 
in quantification” (Kirk, 1996, p. 361) but it would be perhaps better to have 
science without a theory than “science”with a theory contradicted by data.  
There is no science without data. In science, even the best constructed theory 
can be undermined and even abolished by just one contradicting evidence. It would 
be better to accept that it is perhaps impossible to have a general theory in the 
demographic research and that each case should be explained individually. 
The curious feature of the Demographic Transition Theory is that there is not a 
single convincing confirmation of this theory in data. Try as we may, we shall 
never find data showing convincingly the four stages of growth. It is for this reason 
that Montgomery had to stitch the data for Sweden and Mauritius to illustrate this 
theory (Montgomery, n.d.). “I used Mauritius and added Sweden to the end of it. I 
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smoothed the stage 1 of Mauritius a bit. It is composite more than purely 
conceptual” (Montgomery, 2012). It should be emphasised that his aim was not to 
prove this theory but only to illustrate it.  
Data for Sweden are repeatedly used in support of the Demographic Transition 
Theory but we shall show that these data serve as an excellent illustration that the 
Demographic Transition Theory is contradicted by empirical evidence. Data for 
Mauritius are sometimes used but we shall show that they also do not support this 
theory. The best and the most extensive data are for England (Wrigley & Schofield, 
1981). We shall demonstrate that the Demographic Transition Theory is also 
contradicted by these data.  
It is taken for granted that the first stage, which is believed to have lasted for 
thousands of years, was characterised by strong fluctuations in birth and death rates 
but we have absolutely no data to prove it. We do not have data for death and birth 
rates extending over thousands of years, so in this sense at least this part of the 
theory is unscientific. We have no choice but to accept it by faith.  
However, much more has to be accepted by faith. No-one has ever proven the 
existence of the first stage of growth (the epoch of stagnation) proposed by the 
Demographic Transition Theory. In fact, this concept is contradicted by data 
(Nielsen, 2013, 2016; von Foerster, Mora &Amiot, 1960). There was no stagnation 
in the growth of human population. However, for doctrines accepted by faith, 
contradictions in data are routinely and promptly ignored. The only way to accept 
this stage of growth is by faith and by ignoring population data (Maddison, 2010; 
Manning, 2008; US Bureau of Census, 2016) and their contradicting evidence, but 
then it is no longer science. Countless descriptions of this mythical epoch and of the 
mechanism of growth during that long time have to be accepted by faith. 
No-one has ever proven that there was a transition from the first to the second 
stage. No-one has ever proven that there was population explosion at a certain time. 
Rapid growth of the population, interpreted as population explosion, is real but it is 
just the natural continuation of hyperbolic growth (Nielsen, 2014, 2016), the type of 
growth, which was identified over 50 years ago (von Foerster, Mora & Amiot, 
1960) but which was also conveniently ignored.  The transition from the alleged 
first to the second stage has to be accepted by faith and by ignoring not only the 
evidence published over 50 years ago but also the extensive population data 
(Maddison, 2010; Manning, 2008; US Bureau of Census, 2015). 
No-one has ever proven that the mechanisms of growth during the alleged first 
and second stages were different. No-one has ever proven that the Industrial 
Revolution boosted the growth of human population. All these concepts and more 
have to be accepted by faith supported perhaps occasionally by the 
misinterpretation of selected data.  
It is believed that strong fluctuations in birth and death rates are reflected in 
fluctuations in the size of the population. These assumed fluctuations, described 
often as Malthusian oscillations, have been extensively discussed in peer-reviewed 
literature but no-one cared to check whether fluctuations in birth and death rates 
have any influence on the growth of human population. We shall demonstrate that 
these fluctuations have absolutely no impact on the growth of human population. 
It is believed that the growth of the population was stagnant for thousands of 
years and that it was characterised by random variations. According to this belief, 
there were periods of time when the population did not grow at all  and that any 
gains in the growth of human population made over decades were wiped out in one 
or two years (van de Kaa, 2008). Such confident declarations are inaccurate and 
misleading. They might apply to some local populations, sometimes, but they 
certainly do not apply to the growth of the world population (Nielsen, 2013, 2016). 
This claim is also not supported by the regional population data (Maddison, 2010). 
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Normally, in any scientific investigation, empirical evidence such as published 
over 50 years ago (von Foerster, Mora &Amiot, 1960) would have been further 
investigated. Why was it ignored in the demographic research? This early 
observation is now convincingly confirmed (Nielsen, 2016) by new data 
(Maddison, 2010; Manning, 2008; US Bureau of Census, 2015). The growth of the 
population in the past was hyperbolic. It was slow but it was not stagnant or 
random. The first stage proposed by the Demographic Transition Theory did not 
exist and there was no transition from stagnation to growth. 
 
2. Demographic Transition Theory 
We have already mentioned certain features of the Demographic Transition 
Theory but in order to understand the discussed examples for Sweden, Mauritius 
and England we shall now present its brief outline. Its general concepts are 
illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1. Fundamental concepts of the Demographic Transition Theory based on the 
illustrations presented by Montgomery (n.d.) and by van de Kaa (2001, 2002). 
 
Demographic Transition Theory describes changes in birth and death rates, in 
the size of the population and in the rate of natural increase. According to this 
theory, changes in socio-economic conditions lead to transitions in death and birth 
rates, which in turn are reflected in the growth of human population (see for 
instance Caldwell, 1976, 2006; Casterline, 2003; Coale, 1973; Haupt & Kane, 
2005; Kirk, 1996; Landry, 1934; Lee, 2003; Lehr, 2009; McFalls, 2007; Notestein, 
1945; Olshansky & Ault, 1986; Olshansky, Carnes, Rogers, & Smith, 1997, 1998; 
Omran, 1971, 1983, 1998, 2005; Rogers & Hackenberg, 1997; Singha & Zacharia, 
1984; Thompson, 1929; van de Kaa, 2008; Warf, 2010).  These transitions are 
supposed to have been taking place in four fundamental stages, to which other 
stages could be added.  
Stage 1 is supposed to have been the pre-industrial stage of stagnation; Stage 2 
is supposed to represent the post-industrial stage of explosion; Stage 3 is the stage 
of the slowing-down growth; and Stage 4 is the stage of a stable size of the 
population. The number of stages can be extended to five (Haupt & Kane, 2005; 
Olshansky, Carnes, Rogers, & Smith, 1998; van de Kaa, 2008) or maybe even to 
six (Myrskyla, Kohler & Billari, 2009).   
The theory was proposed in its inchoate form in 1929 (Thompson, 1929) but the 
word “transition” was not used until 1934 (Landry, 1934). The first clear outline of 
this theory is attributed to Notestein (1945). Its fundamental concepts illustrated in 
Figure 1 are based on the illustration prepared by Montgomery (n.d) and by van de 
Kaa (2001, 2002).  
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Stage 1 is claimed to have “prevailed since time immemorial” (Komlos, 2000, 
p. 320), i.e. for many thousands of years. The characteristic feature of this stage is 
supposed to have been the high birth and death rates fluctuating around the same 
constant value and producing a stagnant state of growth. The size of the population 
remained approximately constant and the rate of natural increase approximately 
zero. This stage is described as the Preindustrial Age, the Preindustrial Society, the 
Malthusian Regime, the Epoch of Malthusian Stagnation, the Pre-Demographic 
Transition Stage and the Age of Pestilence and Famine. Living conditions during 
that long time are claimed to have been characterised by poor health care, poor 
hygiene, “inadequate diets, as well as unsanitary drinking water and bacterial 
diseases” (Warf, 2010:708). During this stage, there was a continuing struggle for 
survival and the growth of the population was “fluctuating around zero” (Warf, 
2010, p. 708).  
Stage 2 is supposed to have been dramatically different. It was the stage of 
population explosion, usually linked with the Industrial Revolution, the stage of 
transition from ages-long stagnation to a rapid growth of the population. The rate 
of natural increase is supposed to have started to increase rapidly and the size of 
the population exploded. This stage is described as the Early Industrial Society, the 
Early Industrial Age, the Post-Malthusian Regime, the Early-Demographic 
Transition and the Age of Receding Pandemics. The transition from Stage 1 to 
Stage 2 is described as the escape from the Malthusian trap, the great escape and as 
the population explosion.  
The characteristic feature of this stage is supposed to have been the rapidly 
declining death rate described as the mortality transition, allegedly caused by the 
generally improving living conditions reflected in a substantially better health care, 
better hygiene, better access to clean water, improved sanitation and increased food 
production (Chrispeels & Sadava 1994; Galor & Weil, 2000; Thomlinson, 1965). 
These postulated new growth-promoting forces “ignited a population explosion” 
(McFalls, 2007). Another characteristic feature of this stage is the continuing high 
birth rate over a certain time followed by its gradual decline.  
Stage 3 is the stage of the slowing down growth and is described as the Mature 
Industrial Age, the Late Industrial Society, the Modern Growth Regime, the Stage 
of the Late Demographic Transition, or the Stage of Degenerative and Man-made 
Diseases. The difference between the mechanism of growth in Stages 2 and 3, is 
explained by a change in personal preferences prompted by such factors as women 
joining work force, better education, the availability of contraceptives and by the 
general tendency to have smaller number of children in order to improve the 
standard of living.  
Stage 4 is the stage of a stable size of the population and is described as the 
Post-industrial Society, the Post-industrial Age, the Age of Delayed Degenerative 
Diseases, the Post-Demographic Transition Stage or the Stage of Invincibility. This 
stage is characterised by a close balance between birth and death rates, similar to 
the balance claimed for Stage 1, but now both rates are low. Low birth rate is 
explained by personal preferences of replacing quantity by quality. The impact of 
infectious diseases during this stage is claimed to be low and to be replaced by 
harmful changes in the lifestyle. Mortality is now “associated with smoking and 
obesity, as well as, to a lesser extent, car accidents, suicides, and homicides” 
(Warf, 2010, p.710).  
We shall now examine the data for Sweden, Mauritius and England and we 
shall show that they are in contradiction with the Demographic Transition Theory, 
but in perfect harmony with other contradicting evidence (Nielsen, 2013, 2016; von 
Foerster, Mora & Amiot, 1960).  
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 JEPE, 3(1), R.W. Nielsen, p.32-49. 
37 
In comparing this theory with empirical evidence it is essential to understand 
the characteristic features of the alleged Stage 1 and of the transition to Stage 2. 
1. The alleged Stage 1 should be characterised by strong fluctuations in birth 
and death rates. 
2. On average, birth and death rates should be high and they should be 
fluctuating around nearly constant values. 
3. The gap between the fluctuating birth and death rates during this first stage 
should be on average zero. 
4. There should be convincing evidence of stagnation in the growth of the 
population during the alleged Stage 1. 
5. There should be a clear and convincing transition from Stage 1 to Stage 2, 
marked by a clear change in the pattern of growth of human population, from 
stagnation to growth, so clear that it could be described as a takeoff, spurt, or 
explosion.  
6. The transition should be marked by a clear change in the pattern of birth 
and death rates. On average, death rates should start to decrease, while the birth 
rates should, for a certain limited time, remain constant and then they should also 
start to decrease. 
7. The gap between birth and death rates should be progressively getting 
wider from approximately zero in Stage 1 to a certain maximum value, which 
would mark the beginning of Stage 3.  
 
3. Examination of data for Sweden 
Data for Sweden (Statistics Sweden, 1999), used repeatedly in support of the 
Demographic Transition Theory, are displayed in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Demographic Transition Theory is contradicted by the data for Sweden 
(Statistics Sweden, 1999). 
 
These data appear to be in support of the four stages of growth (cf Figure 1): 
Stage 1 with its large and strongly fluctuating birth and death rates; Stage 2 with its 
widening gap between the average values of birth and death rates; Stage 3 with its 
decreasing difference between the birth and death rates; and Stage 4 with its low 
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and nearly equal birth and death rates. These data show also the gradually 
decreasing fluctuations in birth and death rates. 
However, what we should notice immediately is that birth and death rates in the 
alleged Stage 1 do not fluctuate around the same constant value. On average, there 
is a large gap between them. 
In order to produce a stagnant state of growth, birth and death rates have to vary 
around the same constant value.  It is essential for the difference between them to 
be on average zero. This difference could vary between negative or positive values 
but on average it should not be larger than zero.   
Data for death rates or birth rates are often used in support of the Demographic 
Transition Theory but such data are meaningless. They should be used together 
because Demographic Transition Theory describes how both of them should 
behave. If the gap between birth and death rates is not on average zero, there is no 
stagnation in the growth of population. If the gap is not on average zero, the growth 
of population will reveal the presence of a non-random force, constant for the 
exponentiqal growth, steadily-increasing as for instance for the hyperobolic growth 
or steadily decreasing as for the logistic growth. 
In the same source of data (Statistics Sweden, 1999), which are used to defend 
the Demographic Transition Theory, there are also aggregate data describing the 
growth of population in Sweden, shown in the lower section of Figure 2. These 
data clearly demonstrate that the four stages of growth did not exist. Aggregate 
data should never be ignored in testing the Demographic Transition Theory. 
Data for Sweden should have never been used to illustrate the validity of the 
Demographic Transition Theory because such illustrations are incorrect and 
misleading. When used in classrooms or lecture rooms, they do not teach science. 
When used in academic publications in support of the Demographic Transition 
Theory they propagate unscientific and incorrect information.  
Death rate shown in the upper section of Figure 2 is decreasing in the apparent 
agreement with Stage 2 but it was also decreasing in the apparent Stage 1. There 
was no clear mortality transition, which could be claimed as marking the change 
from Stage 1 to Stage 2. Consequently, the apparent Stage 2 cannot be identified as 
Stage 2, which puts in question the other apparent stages.  
The widening gap during the apparent Stage 2 is only slightly larger than the 
gap during the apparent Stage 1. Such a small change could not have produced a 
desired transition from a stagnant growth during the alleged Stage 1 to an explosive 
growth during the apparent Stage 2. In fact, the wide gap between birth and death 
rates during the alleged Stage 1 is obviously so large that there must have been no 
stagnation during this stage but a steadily-increasing growth of population, and 
indeed this expectation is confirmed by the aggregate data describing the growth of 
population in Sweden and shown in the lower part of Figure 2. These data show 
clearly that the four stages of growth did not exist. Demographic Transition Theory 
neither describes nor explains the growth of human population in Sweden and is in 
gross disagreement with data  
The data also show that even large fluctuations in birth and death rates and the 
resulting fluctuations in the rate of natural increase had no impact on the growth of 
population in Sweden. The fluctuations in birth and death rates did not produce the 
normally expected Malthusian oscillations in the growth of population. Maybe 
much larger fluctuation could have produced some noticeable ripples in the growth 
of population but the fluctuations shown in Figure 2 had no effect. 
A study of such fluctuations might be interesting for another reason but it has 
no bearing on explaining the mechanism of growth of human population. If we 
look at Figure 2, we can see that some points for the rate of natural increase are 
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located far from the prevailing trend and yet even such large fluctuation had no 
noticeable effect on the recorded size of the population.  
Summary of the contradicting evidence: 
1. Contrary to the Demographic Transition Theory, the gap between birth and 
death rates during the alleged Stage 1 is not close to zero.  
2. Such a wide gap cannot produce a stagnant state of growth characterised by 
a zero rate of natural increase, and indeed the data show that the rate of natural 
increase during this alleged Stage 1 was not zero. 
3. The gap between birth and death rates during the alleged Stage 2 is only 
slightly larger than during the alleged Stage 1. 
4. Such a difference in the size of the gap cannot produce the population 
explosion, and indeed there was no population explosion in Sweden during the 
displayed time. 
5. “Mortality transition” (the decreasing death rate) commenced during the 
alleged Stage 1 and consequently, the alleged Stage 1 is not Stage 1.  
6. Population data demonstrate that the four stages of growth did not exist. 
They show that there was a steadily increasing growth of population. 
7. Demographic Transition Theory is contradicted by the data for Sweden. 
 
4. Examination of data for Mauritius 
Data for Mauritius (Lehmeyer, 2004; Mauritius, 2015; Statistics Mauritius, 
2014; UN, 2013) are shown in Figure 3. Please notice that the time scales for the 
two diagrams are not the same. 
Using the data for Mauritius in support of the Demographic Transition Theory 
(e.g. Lutz & Qiang, 2002) is surprising, because the population in Mauritius 
represents a minute fraction of the world population, and thus these data can be 
hardly considered as representing a typical patterns of birth and death rates. 
Furthermore, these data are poorly documented and it is uncertain, which areas 
were included in the population surveys.  
 
 
Figure 3. Demographic Transition Theory is contradicted by the data for Mauritius 
(Lehmeyer, 2004; Mauritius, 2015; Statistics Mauritius, 2014; UN, 2013).  
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Data describing birth and death rates, shown in the upper section of Figure 3 
appear to be supporting the Demographic Transition Theory. Birth and death rates 
are at first high and they appear to be fluctuating around the same constant value, 
suggesting Stage 1 of growth.  
There is also a clear mortality transition at a certain time marked by the rapidly 
decreasing death rate, accompanied by an increasing gap between birth and death 
rates, in good agreement with the pattern expected for Stage 2, characterised by a 
transition from stagnation to an explosive growth of the population. Gradually, the 
gap between birth and death rates narrows suggesting Stage 3 with a possibility of 
developing into Stage 4.  
However, this apparent agreement with the theory becomes questionable when 
we look at the time scale. The “epoch of stagnation” as indicated by the merging 
birth and death rates lasted for only around 20 years. We could, perhaps, extend it 
to 40 years but we can see that the gap between birth and death rates started to 
increase from around 1920. The “epoch” is probably nothing more than a 
temporary delay in the growth of the population. 
One of the fundamental principles of scientific investigation is that no relevant 
data should be ignored. Consequently, in order to understand the patterns displayed 
by birth and death rates we have to include also data describing the growth of 
population. These data are shown in the lower part of Figure 3 and they now make 
it perfectly clear that they do not support the Demographic Transition Theory, 
because the population was increasing before the apparent Stage 1. Consequently, 
the apparent Stage 1 is not Stage 1, which means that the apparent Stage 2 is not 
Stage 2. The whole pattern of growth is incompatible with the Demographic 
Transition Theory. The growth of population in Mauritius was increasing, 
sometimes faster and sometimes slower, in complete disagreement with the 
Demographic Transition Theory.    
Data show that over the displayed time the growth of population was at first 
slow, then fast, slowing down, slow, fast, and slowing down again.  Data for 
Mauritius demonstrate that there were more demographic transitions than claimed 
by the Demographic Transition Theory.  
Summary of the contradicting evidence: 
1. While the gap between birth and death rates is close to zero as required by 
the Demographic Transition Theory for the Stage 1, the empirical evidence 
indicates that the stagnant state of growth lasted for only about 20 years or at best 
for only 40 years. The required evidence should be for at least a few hundred years, 
but in principle it should be for thousands of years.  
2. The apparent Stage 1 is not Stage 1 because it was preceded by a fast 
growth of population, which is supposed to characterize Stage 2.  
3. Thus, the apparent Stage 2 is not Stage 2 even though it looks like Stage 2 
because Stage 2 (fast growth of population) was before Stage 1 
4. Population data show that there were three, maybe even four, stages of 
growth during the displayed short time but these stages have nothing to do with the 
Demographic Transition Theory. 
5. Demographic Transition Theory is contradicted by the data for Mauritius.   
 
5. Examination of data for England 
Probably the best, the most reliable and the most extensive demographic data 
we might ever expect to have are for England (Wrigley & Schofield, 1981) 
between 1541 and 1871. These data are important not only because of their high 
accuracy but also because they extend into the time well before of the Industrial 
Revolution, dated between 1760 and 1840 (Floud & McCloskey, 1994) and thus 
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they should reveal the impacts, if any, of this Revolution on the growth of 
population. Furthermore, it is important that these data are for England, where the 
impacts of the Industrial Revolution on the growth of human population should be 
strong and clear.  
It is here, in England, that we should expect a clear confirmation of a change 
from high birth and death rates fluctuating around the same constant value to a new 
pattern characterised by a rapidly widening gap between these two quantities, 
indicating a clear transition from stagnation to population explosion. It is here, in 
England, that we should be able to see a clear correlation between the Industrial 
Revolution and the morality transition (the decreasing death rate); the clear 
confirmation of the beneficial effects of modern progress; the clear evidence of a 
dramatic escape from the Malthusian trap; the dramatic transition from Malthusian 
stagnation (marked by a stagnant stage of growth characterised by Malthusian 
oscillations) to a rapid and sustained growth of human population.   
Birth and death rates, together with the corresponding rate of natural increase in 
England are shown in Figure 4. The time-dependent patterns are entirely different 
than claimed by the Demographic Transition Theory (cf  Figure 1).  
Birth and death rates were always high – before, during and after the Industrial 
Revolution. They were also not fluctuating around a common constant value before 
the Industrial Revolution and there was no morality transition coinciding with this 
event. In fact, Industrial Revolution had no impact on the time-dependent 
distributions of birth and death rates. It is as if this crucial development, which was 
supposed to have had such a dramatic impact on the growth of human population, 
had never happened.  
 
 
Figure 4. Demographic Transition Theory is contradicted by the data for England 
(Wrigley & Schofield, 1981).  
. 
 
Data show not just one but two mortality transitions (decreasing mortality rate) 
both beginning well before the commencement of the Industrial Revolution. 
Correspondingly, the data show not just one but two maxima in the rate of natural 
increase. The increase in the rate of natural increase leading to these two maxima 
began well before the Industrial Revolution. This increase was clearly not caused 
by the Industrial Revolution. A delayed response to the benefits of progress 
associated with the Industrial Revolution could be easily explained, but it would be 
hard, if not impossible, to explain the anticipated response.  
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Growth of human population in England between 1541 and 1871 (Wrigley & 
Schofield, 1981) is shown in Figure 5. The top panel shows all the data at yearly 
intervals. The lower panel shows data at larger time intervals to allow for 
comparing them with the numerical integration of the fluctuating rates of natural 
increase. 
 
Figure 5. Growth of human population in England (Wrigley & Schofield, 1981). 
 
 
Data for birth and death rates and for the growth of population, shown in 
Figures 4 and in the upper panel of Figure 5, respectively, are at yearly intervals. 
However, while the data for birth and death rates and for the corresponding rate of 
natural increase show strong fluctuations, the data for the growth of population do 
not show even a slightest effect of these fluctuations. The growth of population in 
England was immune to the fluctuations in birth and death rates.  
“These models of Malthusian oscillations, although elegant and intriguing, must 
be viewed as quite speculative in their application to any actual populations” (Lee, 
1997). Indeed, their presence is contradicted by the data for England, Sweden and 
Mauritius as well as by the analyses of the world population data (Nielsen, 2013, 
2016).  
We have demonstrated that fluctuations in birth and death rates are not reflected 
in the growth of human population. However, we can reverse our investigation and 
ask whether fluctuations in birth and death rates can generate fluctuations in the 
calculated growth of human population. Suppose we use the empirically-
determined birth and death rates or the rate of the natural increase representing the 
difference between birth and death rates, and suppose that we use these rates to 
calculate the size of the population, will they produce fluctuations in the calculated 
distribution? 
In order to answer this question we have carried out numerical integration of the 
following differential equation:  
1 ( )
( )
( )
e
dS t
R t
S t dt
  
    (1) 
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where ( )S t is the calculated size of human population and ( )eR t is the 
empirically-determined, and fluctuating, rate of natural increase shown in Figure 4. 
Migration rates are relatively small (Wrigley & Schofield, 1981) and can be 
neglected. However, if the calculated distribution of the size of the population is 
not going to agree with population data, they will have to be included.  
Results of these numerical calculations are shown in the lower part of Figure 5. 
The calculated curve is displayed in steps of one year but it follows the data so 
closely that in order to see any possible fluctuations in its calculated values we had 
to show the data at 10-year intervals. Fluctuating birth and death rates or the 
corresponding fluctuating rate of natural increase do not produce even slightest 
fluctuations in the calculated distribution describing the growth of population.  
Growth of population shown in Figure 5 does not display the expected pattern 
of stagnation followed by explosion claimed by the Demographic Transition 
Theory. There was a steady growth of population well before the Industrial 
Revolution. This growth was briefly interrupted but it was resumed again around 
1700. Growth of population in England is not correlated with the Industrial 
Revolution. There is no indication of the prolonged Malthusian stagnation, no 
evidence of Malthusian oscillations, no clear evidence of the existence of stage one 
and no transition to a new stage. It is just a growth, which was increasing, halted 
for a while and started to increase again.  
Demographic Transition Theory is contradicted by data for England, the very 
data, which could have been expected to serve as the strongest confirmation of this 
theory. Fluctuations in birth and death rates shown in Figure 4 had no impact on 
the growth of the population. The typical pattern of stagnation followed by 
explosion is not confirmed by data. Population was increasing well before the onset 
of the Industrial Revolution. After a short delay, the population started to increase 
again but the onset of this new growth was also before the Industrial Revolution 
Growth of human population can be also studied using the reciprocal values of 
data,1/ ( )S t .Such a study gives a new insight into the interpretation of data. This 
method has been discussed elsewhere (Nielsen, 2014).  
Reciprocal values of the size of human population in England and their absolute 
gradient, calculated directly from data and interpolated, are shown in Figure 6. 
The deceasing reciprocal values,1/ ( )S t , of the size of the population indicate 
an increasing growth, and vice versa. The top section of Figure 6 shows that the 
population in England was steadily increasing well before the Industrial 
Revolution, as indicated by the steadily-decreasing reciprocal values. After only a 
brief interruption, the size of the population in England continued to increase, 
confirming the pattern of growth shown in Figure 5.  
There was no stagnation that could be identified as Stage 1 proposed by the 
Demographic Transition Theory. This stage did not exist. In its place there was, in 
general, a steadily-increasing growth. The data show a temporary distortion of this 
trajectory but the general pattern was a continuing increase of the population. 
Furthermore, the data show no clear impact of the Industrial Revolution on the 
growth of population. There was no transition to a distinctly new stage. This 
pattern of growth is in contradiction with the pattern proposed by the Demographic 
Transition Theory. 
The gradient of 1/ ( )S t shown in Figure 6 is generally negative. It is, therefore, 
more conventient to represent it using its absolute value.  
The absolute value of the gradient of 1/ ( )S t  is a convenient indicator allowing 
for detecting changes in the growth pattern. We shall call it the absolute gradient of 
1/ ( )S t . A constant absolute gradient of 1/ ( )S t  represents hyperbolic growth. 
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The decreasing absolute gradient of 1/ ( )S t indicates graual diversion to a slower 
trajectory, while the increasing absolute gradient indicates gradual diversion to a 
faster trajectory. 
 
 
Figure 6. Reciprocal values,1/ ( )S t , of the size of the population and their absolute 
gradient calculated directly from data and by interpolation. 
 
The absolute values of the gradient of 1/ ( )S t data are shown in the lower part 
of Figure 6. If we compare the upper and the lower sections of this figure we can 
see that the growth of the population in England was steadily increasing, as 
indicated by the decreasing reciprocal values 1/ ( )S t , but it was gradually getting 
slower, as indicated by the decreasing the absolute gradient of 1/ ( )S t . After a 
short period of instability, the growth of human population in England started to 
increase again from around 1690 and was accelerating, as indicated by the 
downward bending of the reciprocal trajectory and by its increasing absolute 
gradient. The onset of this new growth occurred about 70 years before the onset of 
the Industrial Revolution. Contrary to the general beliefs, the Industrial Revolution 
did not boost the growth of human population in England where its impacts should 
be stronger than anywhere else. The growth of population was boosted briefly 
before the Industrial Revolution.   
After a certain time, the acceleration of the growth of human population started 
to grow weaker, as indicated by the gradient approaching its maximum value. The 
absolute gradient of the reciprocal values reached its maximum around 1800 or 
right in the middle of the Industrial Revolution and then started to decrease. The 
growth of the population in England started to be gradually diverted to a slower 
trajectory during the Industrial Revolution. 
Thus, the data for England show that there was no stagnation before the 
Industrial Revolution and no boosting of growth by the Industrial Revolution. On 
the contrary, the Industrial Revolution coincides with the slowing-down growth as 
indicated by the maximum in the absolute gradient of 1/ ( )S t . 
If we wanted to claim a cause-effect link between the Industrial Revolution and 
the growth of human population in England we could conclude that the Industrial 
Revolutions slowed down the growth of the population and diverted it to a slower 
trend as indicated by the decreasing absolute gradient of the reciprocal values. 
However, more plausible conclusion is that the Industrial Revolution had no 
impact on the growth of human population. The two processes were totally 
independent and it is incorrect to link them by any cause-effect properties. The 
growth of human population in England must have been prompted by different 
forces than the forces associated with the Industrial Revolution and with the 
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numerous random forces repeatedly proposed to explain the epoch of stagnation, 
which did not exist. 
Summary of the contradicting evidence: 
1. The time dependence of birth and death rates in England between 1541 and 
1871 (Wrigley & Schofield, 1981) is in contradiction with the first two stages of 
growth claimed by the Demographic Transition Theory. The pattern of the 
fluctuating birth and death rates around a common high constant value followed by 
a clear transition to a new stage around the time of the Industrial Revolution is 
contradicted by data. 
2. The first stage of growth proposed by the Demographic Transition Theory 
did not exist. 
3. The data show not just one mortality transition (decreasing death rate) as 
claimed by the Demographic Transition Theory, but two, both of them beginning 
well before the onset of the Industrial Revolution. 
4. There is no positive correlation between the Industrial Revolution and the 
time dependence of birth and death rates. 
5. Data for England show that there were more demographic transitions than 
can be accounted for by the Demographic Transition Theory. 
6. With the exception of a minor delay between around 1656 and 1682, the 
growth of human population in England was steadily increasing. 
7. Reciprocal values of data for the size of human population also confirm 
that Industrial Revolution had no impact on the growth of population in England, 
where this impact should have been stronger than anywhere else 
8. Rather than being boosted by the Industrial Revolution, the growth of the 
population in England started to be diverted to a slower trajectory from around 
1800, i.e. during the Industrial Revolution. 
9. Demographic Transition Theory is contradicted by the data for England 
between 1541 and 1871. 
 
6. Summary and conclusions 
Data for Sweden, used repeatedly in support of the Demographic Transition 
Theory, are shown to be in its direct contradiction. They show that the four stages 
of growth claimed by the Demographic Transition Theory did not exist. There was 
no stagnation (no Stage 1) and no transition to a new stage (Stage 2) claimed by the 
Demographic Transition Theory. There was no population explosion and no 
transitions to stages three and four. There was just a steadily-increasing, single-
stage, growth of the population. The gap between death and birth rates in the 
apparent Stage 1 was large and there was no dramatic change in its size during the 
usually claimed but non-existent transition from Stage 1 to Stage 2.   
The data for Mauritius, used sometimes in support of the Demographic 
Transition Theory (e.g. Lutz & Qiang, 2002) also show a clear disagreement with 
this theory. The apparent Stage 1 suggested by the birth and death rates, even if 
accepted, lasted for only a few decades. However, when aggregate data are 
included, they show that the apparent Stage 1 was not Stage 1 because it was not 
preceded by stagnation but by a steadily increasing growth of the population. The 
pattern of growth of human population does not fit into the pattern claimed by the 
Demographic Transition Theory 
The exceptionally good data for England, 1541-1871, are also in contradiction 
with the Demographic Transition Theory. The expected stages in birth and death 
rates are not confirmed by data. There were two mortality transitions during that 
time, both commencing well before the onset of the Industrial Revolution. There is 
no correlation between the Industrial Revolution and the time-dependence of the 
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birth and death rates in England. There was no stagnation followed by population 
explosion. 
Industrial Revolution did not boost the growth of population in England. On the 
contrary, the data show that from around 1800, i.e. during the Industrial 
Revolution, the growth of population in England started to be diverted to a slower 
trajectory. Consequently, if we wanted to link the Industrial Revolution with the 
growth of population we could claim that Industrial Revolution slowed down the 
growth of the population. However, more plausible conclusion is that the two 
processes were totally independent. The data indicate that it is incorrect to use the 
Industrial Revolution to explain the mechanism of growth of human population, 
even in England, the centre of this revolution.  
While the data for Sweden show a steady growth of the population without any 
signs of four stages claimed by the Demographic Transition Theory, the data for 
Mauritius and England demonstrate that there were more stages than one can 
account for by using the Demographic Transition Theory. 
The study presented here also shows that even large fluctuations in birth and 
death rates and in the corresponding growth rate have no impact on the growth of 
population. It is possible that exceptionally large fluctutions in birth and death rates 
and in the corresponding growth rate might produce some noticable ripples in the 
distribution describing the grwoth of population but it would be unconvincing to 
claim that such possible small ripples had a strong contribution to the mechanism 
of growth. It is, therefore, incorrect to imagine that fluctuations in birth and death 
rates can produce the often-claimed Malthusian oscillations in the size of the 
population.  
A study published over 50 years ago (von Foerster, Mora & Amiot, 1960) 
demonstrated that the growth of human population was hyperbolic. Results of this 
study show that there was no Malthusian stagnation in the growth of population 
and consequently that Stage 1 claimed by the Demographic Transition Theory did 
not exist. In science, even one contradicting evidence is sufficient to show that a 
contradicted theory is incorrect. Now we have more extensive sources of data 
(Maddison, 2010; Manning, 2008; US Bureau of Census, 2015). They all show that 
there was no stagnation in the growth of human population (Nielsen, 2013, 2016). 
They show clearly that Stage 1 claimed by the Demographic Transition Theory did 
not exist and that there was no transition to the alleged Stage 2. They show that the 
Demographic Transition Theory is contradicted by data. 
Demographic Transition Theory has a strong link with the Unified Growth 
Theory (Galor, 2005, 2011), which also claims, incorrectly, the existence of the 
epoch of stagnation and a dramatic transition to a new stage of economic growth 
described repeatedly as takeoff. A study of the income per capita (GDP/cap) 
combines the study of the economic growth, as expressed by the GDP, and the 
study of the growth of population.  
The time distribution of the historical GDP/cap values is claimed in the Unified 
Growth Theory to be made of a prolonged stagnation followed by a sudden takeoff 
in much the same way as the Demographic Transition Theory claims that the 
growth of human population can be represented by a prolonged stage of stagnation 
followed by a sudden explosion. Both interpretations are incorrect and both of 
them are based by illusions reinforced by the incorrect interpretations of hyperbolic 
growth.  
The growth of human population was slow over a long time and fast over a 
short time but it was slow because it was hyperbolic and fast because it was 
hyperbolic. It was a monotonically-increasing hyperbolic distribution (Nielsen, 
2016; von Foerster, Mora & Amiot, 1960). Economic growth, whether expressed in 
terms of the GDP or GDP/cap, was slow over a long time and fast over a short time 
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but it was slow because it was hyperbolic and fast because it was hyperbolic 
(Nielsen, 2014, 2015). There was no stagnation and no sudden takeoff.  
Demographic Transition Theory is incorrect and the only way to accept it is by 
ignoring the repeatedly contradicting empirical evidence and by placing full trust in 
stories based largely on creative imagination perfected by accretion over many 
years and by many people, each new imagined explanation or concept creating new 
ideas and all of them growing into the established knowledge in demography.   
The Demographic Transition Theory (or Model) has been a ghost story for at 
least 20 years (Abernethy, 1995) and it is not clear why its concepts have not been 
abandoned long time ago. It would be probably better to accept openly and clearly 
that each case should be studied individually and that it is not necessary to 
reconcile them with some kind of a master theory, which at present does not exist.  
Scientific principles of investigation can be used even in the absence of an all-
encompassing theory, and the fundamental principle is to refrain from ignoring any 
relevant data particularly if they contradict the accepted interpretations. It appears 
that the continuing use of the Demographic Transition Theory makes the 
demographic research unscientific because by now and over many years this field 
of research evolved into a strong system of concepts many of which can be 
accepted only by faith.  
There is also another serious problem with the continuing acceptance of this 
theory. Demographers might be aware of the fundamental problems associated 
with Demographic Transition Theory. However many teachers, lecturers and 
university professors might be less informed. They accept it as scientific and they 
teach it to younger generations, who accept this theory as presented to them 
believing that they learn science.  
For instance, quite recently, Thompson and Roberge (2015) published an article 
in which they present a diagram showing the four stages of growth proposed by the 
Demographic Transition Theory. They show how to help students to unpack “this 
rich display of information” (p. 254) without being aware that they are helping to 
unpack this rich source of misinformation. It would be more useful to teach 
students why the diagram they see is a misleading source of misinformation. It is a 
fiction story, a ghost story, presented as science, but teachers might not be aware of 
the problems permeating the corridors of science.  
Correct understanding of the growth of human population is important but the 
misleading information presented by the Demographic Transition Theory is 
seriously harmful because this theory does not explain the growth of human 
population but presents concepts and explanations, which when closely examined 
are contradicted by empirical evidence. It is better to have no theory than a 
misleading theory. This theory is the source of misinformtion presented as science 
but it is not science.  
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